What Email Needs
E. Gerck, Ph.D.
Copyright
(c) 2005 by E. Gerck, first published online on September 30, 2005.
All rights reserved, free copying and citation allowed with source and
author reference.
Abstract
This is a public discussion
paper on email security. The paper is published in sections, each
section presented after sufficient time for feedback. Join the
discussion in the
Blog
and help shape this paper and its conclusions.
Contents
Introduction
We all know what email needs. Security. And we need email
security
for both sender and recipient, end-to-end, and after the end point as
well -- after the email arrives. Email security for the message and for
the email addresses.
But, we have so many email security solutions already! Email
encryption and digital signing with public-key cryptography was made
possible for everyone on the Internet more than 20 years ago, with PGP.
Microsoft Outlook, ubiquitious in corporations and available as the
free Express version, uses public-key cryptography to encrypt and
digitally sign email with a single click. Just search for "email
security" and you will find pages and pages of solutions, for
everything that's wrong with email including fraud, spam, spoofing,
phishing, and eavesdropping.
Many medicines is a sign of no cure.
Public-key cryptography gave the impression that email message
security could
be achieved quite simply. The public-key can be distributed at will, no
need for
secrecy, and anyone can receive private and secure messages. The same
procedure
being applied to each side, sender and receiver, both could immediately
engage
in private and secure communication.
However, despite the apparent simplicity and widespread
availability
of public-key cryptography, less than 5% of all email is encrypted.
Banks won't even consider using encryption for sending out monthly
statements and notices. It's not just the mounting problem with email
fraud schemes such as spoofing and phishing. Banks discovered that not
even their own employees were willing to use encryption.
1. Why Is Email Encryption Not Used?
One common explanation why email encryption is not used is
that people just don't need secure email;
if they would, they'd use encryption. Given the successful use of
encryption for web sites, with SSL, and the obvious need to protect
information from hackers, why would information sent by email not need
protection as well?
Thus, in the same way that bank statements, contracts, medical
records, job offers and personal correspondence are invariably sealed
in envelopes before they are sent using postal mail, correspondence
delivered by email would also need to be sealed by encryption.
Furthermore, because email messages can linger on in servers and caches
long after they are deleted by the recipient and sender in their own
computers, unprotected information sent in an email could come back in
the future to haunt senders.
Another explanation is that people do not know that regular
email is
not secure; if they would, they'd use encryption. However, high-profile
email disclosures and attacks such as phishing emails are in the daily
news. Every day, many millions of Internet users receive emails from
themselves, their banks, and even their friends, that they never sent.
The Missouri Bar Disciplinary Counsel, for example, requires all
Missouri attorneys to notify all recipients of email that:
"(1) email communication is not a secure method of communication,
(2)
any email that is sent between you and this law firm may be copied and
held by various computers it passes through as it is transmitted,
(3)
persons not participating in our communication may intercept our
communications by improperly accessing your computer or this law firm's
computers -- or even some computer unconnected to either of us that the
e-mail may have passed through."
Thus, if people do need secure email and if they do know that
regular email is not secure...
Why is email encryption not used?
...Continues in Part II (to be uploaded)
Contact Information
Ed Gerck, Ph.D.
DISCLAIMER:
This paper does not intend to
cover all the details of the technologies
reported, or all the variants thereof. Its coverage is limited to
provide support and references to the work in progress on new email
security
technology and to unify references, concepts and terminology. No
political or country-oriented criticism is to be construed from this
work, which respects all the apparently divergent efforts found today
on the subjects treated. Products, individuals or organizations are
cited as part of the fact-finding work needed for this site and their
citation
constitutes neither a favorable nor an unfavorable recommendation or
endorsement.
Copyright
(c) 2005 by E. Gerck, first published online on September 30, 2005.
All rights reserved, free copying and citation allowed with source and
author reference.
|